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REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL REGIMES
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT*

Regional integration is the dominant trend in the international trading system. The strength of this trend was open to question as late as
1989. The European Community had emerged as a dominant player in
the international trade and political arenas, but the special factors which
had impelled the formation and subsequent development of the Community might have been anomalous. The United States government persistently questioned Community policy as a threat to the liberal trading
system reflected in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The European Community's program to complete its internal
market by the end of 1992 was attacked as a protectionist plan to create a
Fortress Europe.
President Bush's 1990 announcement of plans to negotiate a free
trade agreement with Mexico, as well as the assumed and later formalized plan to include Canada within a contemplated North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) regime, represented a surprising shift in the
focus of U.S. trade policy. Suddenly the principal state advocate of global
trade policy had shifted course. This shift is destined to send trade policy
ripples around the world as governments scramble to define the implications of a global trading regime dominated by trading blocs.
Several factors motivated the Bush Administration to open the
NAFTA negotiations and it is difficult to say whether a single factor was
predominant. The Administration no doubt acted in part to stabilize the
government of President Salinas, which has significantly liberalized Mexican economic policies with respect to foreign investment and trade. The
Administration presumably viewed the NAFTA's promise of accelerated
economic development in Mexico as a partial remedy to U.S. immigration problems. Improved investment opportunities for American compa* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology;
B.A. 1974, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1977, Yale University; LL.M. 1989, University of
California, Berkeley. This Essay was initially prepared for and presented at the Faculty Dedication
Symposium at Chicago-Kent College of Law in March 1992. It was revised in December 1992 to
take into account the signing by the heads of state of Canada, Mexico and the United States of a
draft North American Free Trade Agreement. Some of the revised portions of the Essay are adapted
from the author's article Integration without Institutionx"The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and
the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMp. L. (forthcoming 1992).
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nies, particularly among President Bush's southwest constituent base,
played a role in the decision. The Administration also sent an important
message to the European Community. The United States would not sit
idly by while the Community established an integrated trading network
among a large and powerful group of industrialized states, with tentacles
extending throughout the developing world. The United States could
equally well pursue an integrated Western Hemispheric sphere of economic predominance and, if need be, protectionism. On December 17,
1992 the Presidents of the United Mexican States and the United States
of America, and the Prime Minister of Canada, signed a North American
Free Trade Agreement which, however, remains subject to approval by
the legislature of each of these countries.' Though eventual approval of
the NAFTA by the U.S. Congress seems likely, the election of Bill Clinton to succeed President Bush increased the likelihood that at least some
parts of the agreement, and particularly those regarding the environment, will be subject to further negotiation (perhaps along a parallel
track).
As the European Community and United States pursue their economic agendas, other regions are reacting. The Southern Cone arrangement involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay is making
progress which the more ambitious LAFTA (and subsequent LAIA) arrangement did not. The Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) countries have taken tentative steps towards a regional arrangement. Requests for the negotiation of bilateral free trade arrangements arrive at the U.S. Trade Representative's office with remarkable
frequency. In the meantime, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in
the GATT floundered over the issue of agricultural export subsidy reductions. Until quite recently, French unwillingness to coordinate its policy
with the rest of the European Community appeared to doom the negotiations, while remarkable progress otherwise was made in a variety of areas. While prospects for successful completion of the Uruguay Round
recently have improved, no particular Outcome is by any means assured.
Failure of the Uruguay Round negotiations would doubtless accelerate
the trend toward regionalization.
There is little question that there are significant risks inherent in the
regionalization of the international trading system. The evolution of the
1. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Signed in 3 Capitals, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at Cl.
The text of the draft NAFTA referred to in this Essay is that prepared on September 6, 1992, which
was subject to further legal review in order to ensure its overall consistency and clarity. This text was
made available to the public by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 6, 1992 (not yet in force) [hereinafter Draft NAFTA].
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European Community suggests that regional integration at least may offer the reward of progressive social development among a group of states
as a compensation for these risks. This Essay considers one aspect of the
regional integration phenomenon, examining it in the specific context of
its present and potential impact on regimes for the protection of the environment. This Essay will consider whether the European Community
model for protection of the environment may constitute a prototype for
other regional arrangements and a building bloc for the global trading
system as a whole. The proposal for an environmental regime within the
draft North American Free Trade Agreement is considered in comparison to the Community model. Differences in the level of political commitment to the goal of environmental protection within the two regions
will emerge as the fundamental determinant of the ultimately disparate
character of their legal regimes with respect to the environment. The
comparison nevertheless offers a few suggestions with respect to the regime under consideration for the NAFTA. In the final analysis this Essay suggests that a regional approach to trade-related environmental
issues is a positive development from a global welfare perspective.
I.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE

Elsewhere I have analyzed in some detail the potential advantages
and disadvantages of regional integration arrangements and will briefly
summarize a few earlier observations here. 2 The traditional economic
analysis of regional arrangements seeks to determine whether a particular arrangement will be net trade creating or trade diverting and therefore beneficial to global economic welfare. Traditional economic analysis
has a number of inherent shortcomings. Economic analyses of the same
regional arrangements have reached widely disparate conclusions depending on the assumptions adopted. Data has proven to be difficult to
obtain and unreliable. Ex ante predictions of net trade creation/trade
diversion have not been accurate. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the value of regional arrangements involves the consideration of
benefits and costs outside the sphere of analytic economics.
The primary disadvantages of regional trading arrangements are:
(1) at least in the foreseeable future, they will necessarily preclude many
states from fully sharing in their economic benefits; (2) they distort
2. See Frederick M. Abbott, GA IT and the European Community: A Formulafor Peaceful
Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Abbott, GA TT and the European Community] and Frederick M. Abbott, Integration without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC
Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP.L. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter
Abbott, Integration without Institutions].
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global trading patterns and impede the operation of comparative advantage, and (3) they divert the attention of trade negotiators from seeking
global solutions to economic and social problems. All of the forgoing
tendencies of regional integration are likely to increase the schism between levels of economic development in industrialized and developing
countries.
On the other hand, regional integration arrangements may well be
the building blocs of a more successful global trading regime. Regional
arrangements may be more able to rapidly achieve success in realizing
the advantages of the open trading system, because the states comprising
a regional arrangement are more likely to be at a relatively comparable
level of economic development. This factor should generally reduce the
potential for economic and social dislocation resulting from the opening
of markets. This is particularly true with respect to permitting the free
mobility of labor. Moreover, as evidenced by the European Community,
the successful regional arrangement may be able to form and maintain
institutional arrangements which are better able both to promote cooperation and to resolve the inevitable conflicts between state members of the
system. The European Community has been particularly successful in
establishing the right of private individuals to challenge both member
state and Community government activities. The success of the Community in promoting economic integration has produced important corollary benefits in the promotion and protection of human rights. Of course,
an undeniable prerequisite to the level of success achieved by the Community in realizing the benefits of integration is the willingness of states
to cede elements of their sovereign prerogative to regional central
institutions.
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM

During the past decade, and most notably during the past several
years, the problem of protecting the global environment has been perceived as a trade issue. As most, if not all, forms of economic activity
impact the natural and man-made environment, the establishment of a
nexus between international trade regulation and international environmental regulation was inevitable as international trading activity accelerated and global economic interdependence became manifest.
The global system for protection of the environment is primarily a
dual system comprised of international treaties establishing transnational
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standards in a few important areas, 3 for example with respect to the production and sale of CFCs, and national systems of regulation principally
governing discrete territories. 4 Most regulation is undertaken on a state
by state basis and the levels of protection in place vary widely among
states. The level of protection is largely, though not wholly, dependent
on the level of economic development in each state. In the absence of
agreement among states on international standards to govern certain
common areas, the United States in particular has adopted certain measures intended to have extraterritorial effect.5 The recently concluded
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) added to the multilaterally agreed legal standards for the protection of the environment and provided a framework for further
cooperative development. 6 However, the UNCED instruments did not
fundamentally alter the existing international legal framework with respect to the environment in the sense that for the foreseeable future the
system will continue to be one which principally relies on the prescription and enforcement by individual countries and regional organizations
of their own regulatory measures.
The fact that there is not a wide range of international agreements
establishing environmental protection standards has and will continue to
generate conflict. States will continue to adopt measures restricting access to their territorial markets to products complying with certain standards, such as standards governing automobile emissions. Affected states
will question whether such regulations are based on an objectively verifiable scientific basis. The beef hormone dispute between the United States
and the European Community, though dealing with a question of human
health rather than the environment, classically illustrates the difficulties
inherent in resolving such conflicts when scientific data is indeterminate.
Efforts by the United States to protect marine mammals, through the
adoption of legislation intended to establish standards of care for foreign
fishing fleets by threatening to deny them access to the U.S. market, led
3. See generally Trade and the Environment: FactualNote by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. L
6896 (Sept. 18, 1991).
4. See, e.g., David D. Caron, The Law of the Environment:A Symbolic Step of Modest Value,
14 YALE J. INT'L. L. 528 (1989).
5. See, Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972)
(codified in part as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988)).
6. This past summer more than 170 nations met at Rio de Janeiro to map a strategy for
dealing with global environmental concerns. The results of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development included a Declaration on Environment and Development, the signature
of Conventions on Biological Diversity and Climate Change, other statements of principle, and approval of a comprehensive Agenda 21 proposal for coordinated international action with respect to
the environment. Documents reprintedat United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992).
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to a decision by a GATT dispute settlement panel that such legislation is
GATT-illegal. 7 Until international standards of environmental protection are adopted, trade-related conflict between states with disparate
levels of environmental protection will be inevitable. States with high
standards of environmental protection will block imports of polluting
goods. States with high standards governing production processes will
attempt to impose extraterritorial standards on states with lesser standards to protect the totality of an interdependent global environment.
States with high standards, suspecting that such standards impose increased costs on locally produced products, will in one form or another
attempt to tax imports from states with lesser standards. The international trading regime is implicated in the solution to environment-related
conflicts because the ability to deny access to markets is one of the few
mechanisms available, short of violent coercion, to compel environmental protection. For better or worse, these conflicts largely pit the rich
against the poor, north against south.
III.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS ENVIRONMENTAL

BUILDING BLOCS

Global environmental issues are best resolved by the negotiation and
adoption of multilateral agreements. The multilateral negotiation process
is democratic and requires that the interests of all participants be taken
into account. At present this solution presents two problems. First, differences between the industrialized and developing countries concerning
what might constitute appropriate levels of protection tend to be greatgaps may be unbridgeable. Second, the pace of multilateral negotiations
is almost invariably slow. Negotiations over environmental issues are not
likely to constitute an exception (except perhaps with respect to problems
of the most immediate and manifest urgency). The recently completed
UNCED Conference illustrated some of the difficulties inherent in the
adoption of multilaterally agreed upon environmental standards. While
one of the principal achievements of the Conference was a broadly
drafted statement of principles which may inform future negotiations and
national regulation, this statement does not establish regulatory standards likely to be considered directly applicable. In only two areas were
formally binding treaties signed, and at least one of these treaties (the
Convention on Biological Diversity) requires further negotiation on oper7. United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991). See Frederick M. Abbott, InternationalTrade Rules, World Market Conditions and

Environmental Effects, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 227 (Giinther Handl ed., 1992).
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ational details. In this regard it may be fruitful to consider whether some
of the factors which may cause regional integration arrangements to
more effectively resolve general trade issues than global multilateral
mechanisms may likewise cause them to more effectively resolve traderelated environmental issues than global mechanisms.
The more closely approximate states are with respect to their level
of economic development, the less likely they are to have competing interests with respect to the adoption of environmental standards. Regional
integration arrangements typically involve states which are politically
and developmentally compatible. These states are more likely to share
common interests than the international community at large. States with
common interests are more likely to find concessions of sovereign prerogative to a common goal tolerable. It may therefore be likely that states
constituting a regional arrangement will be more likely to achieve an integrated environmental regime than will the global universe of states.
The level of protection will logically reflect the level of economic development in the regional arrangement as a whole.
Regional integration arrangements represent a threat to the global
trading system when they discriminate in favor of regionally-based enterprises. Discrimination distorts the operation of comparative advantage.
Discrimination by more highly developed countries at the expense of the
developing countries is particularly problematic because it exacerbates
inequities in the global distribution of wealth. While the adoption of
strict environmental standards may be accomplished in a nominally nondiscriminatory manner-that is, in a manner which permits manufacturers wherever located to conform to the standards-such standards are
likely to be operationally discriminatory. Manufacturer/exporters in
countries outside of a regional territory will have less access to rule-making procedures and therefore face greater lag times with respect to compliance. The net effect will be to confer an advantage on regionally-based
enterprises as against foreign-based enterprises. The operational discrimination which might result from the establishment of strict environmental
standards by a regional arrangement is similar to the operational discrimination arising from the establishment of other regional regulatory
regimes, such as regimes establishing technical standards for telecommunications equipment. The GATT has attempted to minimize the potential for trade conflict created by such regulatory regimes through the
negotiation of codes and other agreements intended to establish uniform
guidelines for states which accept them. There is no GATT agreement
specifically respecting the environment on the immediate horizon.
The potential negative trade consequences of regional environmental
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regulation should be balanced against the potential regional benefits.
Although it is remotely conceivable that such a balancing of costs and
benefits could be performed on an objective basis, the quantity of data
which would be required and the development of a mathematical basis by
which an evaluation could be made will, for present purposes, be assumed to be beyond existing scientific methods. A subjective judgment
must therefore be made. On a subjective level, the benefits likely to accrue to a geographic region from imposing strict standards of environmental protection would appear to outweigh the potential harm to global
trading interests. I reach this conclusion by considering that environmental degradation may have long term or irreversible consequences.
Although delaying the adoption by regional arrangements of more stringent environmental standards until broad multilateral consensus is
reached might reduce economic costs for developing countries in the
short term, delay by both regional arrangements and developing countries in adopting more stringent environmental standards will give rise to
long term costs. If environment-related regulation by the more highly
industrialized regions causes some diminution in the growth rate of developing regions, this diminution is unlikely to be severe, and should produce offsetting social welfare benefits. The environmental impact of rapid
economic growth without consideration of social welfare costs may be
observed clearly in a number of newly industrialized countries and, on
the basis of this observation, it is not difficult to conclude that a somewhat higher level of attention to environmental protection may have been
worthwhile, even at the cost of marginally less rapid development. There
is a point at which environmental compliance costs might squeeze the
developing countries outside the global economy. More highly developed
regions may need to grant special treatment to exports from developing
countries if this point is reached.
The regionalization of environmental issues may divert attention
from a global approach to these issues. However, global agreement on
environmental standards is likely to emerge slowly, except perhaps with
respect to the most urgent situations. This fact provides a basis for a
regional approach. More highly developed regions may well make more
rapid progress with respect to the environment than less developed regions, but with some conscious effort the global net result may on the
whole be positive. Environmental protection is not likely a zero sum
game. If the more highly developed regions make some use of lesser developed regions as less strictly regulated production platforms, an effort
must be made to assure that there are minimum standards in place in the
less developed regions to assure a net positive result.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Further illumination of the value of regionalization may be gained
by an examination of the environmental regime of the European Community-without doubt the world's most highly evolved regional integration arrangement.
IV.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MODEL FOR PROTECTION
OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The European Community was established among six member
states by the Treaty of Rome in 1958.8 The treaty established certain
basic principles among the member states, including the free movement
of goods (established by the progressive elimination of tariffs, and the
elimination of quotas and measures with equivalent effect), the free
movement of persons, services and capital. The treaty established four
principal institutions, the Council of Ministers, Commission, Court of
Justice and Parliament. The Council is composed of the heads of government of the member states and has primary authority to take decisions
affecting the Community. The Commission is responsible for overseeing
implementation of the treaty and decisions taken pursuant to it, making
recommendations to the Council, and taking certain decisions. The
Court of Justice ensures that in the interpretation and application of the
treaty the law is observed. The Parliament, which is composed of a set
number of members elected from each member state, possessed limited
advisory powers under the Treaty of Rome, which were expanded somewhat by the Single European Act (SEA), which amended the Treaty of
Rome in 1987. The role of the European Parliament would be enhanced
upon entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. 9 The
Community presently is composed of twelve member states and maintains several important association arrangements, including the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and Lome arrangements, which
extend its influence well beyond its twelve members. The EFTA arrangement may soon be transformed into the European Economic Area (EEA)
arrangement which will further integrate the EFTA states with the
Community. 10
8. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
9. See, Belgium-Denmark-France-Federal Republic of Germany-Greece-Ireland-Italy-Luxembourg-Netherlands-Portugal-Spain-United Kingdom Treaty on European Union and Final Act,
Done at Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992), e.g., at arts. 137, 189, 189a, 189b and 189c
[hereinafter Treaty on European Union].
10. See generally Thomas Cottier, Constitutional Trade Regulation in National and International Law: Structure-Substance Pairings in the EFTA Experience, in NATIONAL CONsTrruTiONS
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Meinhard Hilf and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., forth-
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The Treaty of Rome, prior to amendment by the SEA, did not explicitly acknowledge protection of the environment as a goal of the Community.11 Each member state retained responsibility for regulating its
own environment under the general scheme of Community regulation.
Article 30 of the treaty precluded each state from adopting measures
having the effect of quantitative restrictions on trade, thereby establishing a limitation on environmental measures as with respect to other regulatory measures, i.e. they could not merely be disguised restraints on
trade. Article 36 of the treaty permitted each state to adopt restrictions
on trade based, inter alia, on public policy or the protection of health and
life of humans, animals or plants. Under this general scheme, states were
entitled to adopt and maintain environmental protection laws which
might restrain trade, provided that such measures were justified.
Article 100 of the treaty authorized the Council, acting unanimously on recommendation from the Commission, to issue directives for
the approximation (i.e. harmonization) of the laws and regulations of the
member states which "directly affect the establishing or functioning of
the common market." A "directive" is an order by the Council to all
member states that they must conform their own legislation to the standards set forth in the order. A directive is distinguished from a "regulation" which operates to directly establish law throughout the member
states. Operating under its article 100 authority, the Council issued a
number of directives during the 1970s intended to establish environmental standards for the Community. These included directives concerning
standards for drinking and bathing water, detergents and air pollution
from motor vehicles. 12 In 1985, the Court of Justice, confirmed that protection of the environment is an essential objective of the Community,
enabling the Council to adopt directives restricting the free movement of
goods, provided that the conditions of proportionality and non-discrimicoming 1992)(on file with author). Although the EEA agreement was recently rejected by Swiss
voters it appears likely that the EEA will be established without Switzerland. See Swiss Rejection of
Closer European Ties Said to Delay EEA Treaty's Implementation, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2084
(Dec. 9, 1992).
11. There are several excellent and comprehensive studies of the Community environmental
arrangement. See DR. LUDWIG KRAMER, EEC TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(1990); 2 ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY,
(Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985), and; Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Roszell D. Hunter, The European
Community Environmental Legal System, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10106 (February, 1992).
Note that Rehbinder and Stewart does not reflect changes effected by the Single European Act.
12. The motor vehicle pollution directive, in particular, was adopted not only to raise standards
to a certain level throughout the Community, but also to preclude member states from restricting
imports of motor vehicles produced in other member states because of failure to meet higher
standards.
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nation are met.1 3 The Court thereby validated what the Council had assumed, i.e., that despite the absence of reference to the environment in
the Treaty of Rome, regulating protection of the environment is an essential component of a socially responsible arrangement to facilitate trade
and economic development.
The Single European Act (SEA) explicitly incorporated environmental objectives into the Treaty of Rome and effected certain institutional adjustments.14 Article 130r of the amended treaty establishes
environmental goals and principles for action. It provides that preventive
action should be taken, that environmental damage should be rectified at
the source, and that the polluter should pay. It further provides that
"[e]nvironmental protection requirements shall be a component of the
Community's other policies." 15 These of course are significant statements
with respect to Community policy. The adoption of the "polluter pays"
principle indicates that general tax levies should not be used for environmental clean-up purposes. The statement that environmental protection
requirements should be taken into account with respect to other Community policies is apparently unique within the Treaty of Rome structure in
terms of the breadth of commitment conveyed. Article 130r further provides that action should be taken at the Community level when environmental objectives can be better attained at the Community level than at
16
the level of individual member states.
On the institutional arrangement level, Article 130s provides that:
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall decide what action is to be taken by
the Community.
The Council shall, under the conditions laid down in the preceding subparagraph, define those
matters on which decisions are to be
17
taken by qualified majority.
The Economic and Social Committee is a purely advisory body established by the Treaty of Rome with representatives from various spheres
13. Case 240/83, Procureur de la Repubdic v. Association de Defense Procurer Bruleurs
D'huiles Usagees, 1985 E.C.R. 531.
14. See Meinhard Hilf, The Single European Act of 1992: Legal Implicationsfor Third Countries, 1 EJIL 89 (1990) and Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Single European Act, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 371 (1990). For the text of the Treaty of Rome as amended by the SEA, see 1
Treaties Establishing the European Communities 207 ff(1987) [hereinafter Amended Treaty of
Rome].
15.

Amended Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at art. 130r(2).

16. Id. at art. 130r(4).
17. Id. at art. 130s.
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of economic and social activity.' 8 The SEA expanded the power of Parliament primarily with respect to directives and regulations intended to
be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority. To the extent that
article 130s requires that decisions on actions to be taken be unanimously
adopted, the Parliament's role under this provision remains purely advisory and consultative. If the Council decides that certain measures may
be adopted by qualified majority, then the Parliament is able to force the
Council in respect to these matters to act unanimously. The mechanism
for Parliament's cooperation is set forth in article 149, which forces the
Council to adopt unanimously proposals which are rejected by the Parliament, and requires the Commission and Council to "take into account" proposed parliamentary amendments to Council proposals
adopted by qualified majority, although permitting the Council to act by
qualified majority in the final analysis. Article 130s must be read in conjunction with article 100a of the treaty, added by the SEA, which permits
the Council to adopt approximation directives by qualified majority,19
acting on a proposal from the Commission "in cooperation with the European Parliament." Because article 100a(3) indicates that Commission
proposals with respect to the environment in which qualified majority
voting is sought will take as a base a high level of protection, it is apparent that Council approximation directives with respect to the environment may be taken under the qualified majority procedure. With respect
to harmonization measures adopted by qualified majority under article
100a, the Parliament has the power under article 149 to force the Council
to act by consensus.
The new SEA environmental arrangement provides at article 130t
that member states are not precluded from adopting environmental
measures more stringent than those adopted by the Council pursuant to
article 130s, provided they are compatible with the treaty. In addition,
the article 100a qualified majority voting provision provides that a member state may, with respect to a provision adopted by qualified majority,
if it deems it necessary, apply national provisions relating to protection of
the environment, upon confirmation from the Commission that such provisions are not disguised restrictions on trade. 20 The exception to article
100a measures is understood to relate to measures imposing more strin18. Id. at art. 193, "in particular, representatives of producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations and representatives of the general public." Id.
19. The Council's qualified majority voting procedure is set forth in article 148. Fifty-four votes
are required on a proposal from the Commission, fifty-four votes and eight countries otherwise.
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom each have ten votes, the remaining nations each
have some lesser number of votes (for example, Netherlands has five and Denmark three).
20. Amended Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at art. 100a(4).
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gent standards. 2 1
If the Maastricht Treaty on European Union comes into force, certain changes will be effected with respect to the decision-making process
for environmental measures. Council measures involving "general action
programmes setting out priority objectives" will be adopted under a new
article 189b procedure pursuant to which the Parliament may reject a
Council proposal, with no possibility of Council override by unanimous
decision. 22 In general, the Council will be able to act by qualified majority, except that the Parliament will be able to force the Council to act
unanimously. 23 In a few defined circumstances, such as with respect to
matters "primarily of a fiscal nature," the Council may act unanimously
under a procedure in which the role of the Parliament is less specifically
defined, and in which the Council may define its authority to act by qualified majority. 24 The net result of these amendments would appear to be
an enhancement of the power of the European Parliament with respect to
environmental matters because it is given the right to block adoption by
the Council of major policy initiatives.
In 1990 the Council adopted a regulation establishing a European
Environment Agency 25 modeled on the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, but with significantly less power. The role of the new agency is
to collect and provide objective data for the Council and Commission
which will enable them to make informed decisions. The agency has no
enforcement powers independent of the Commission itself. The Commission is the enforcement arm of the Community. The agency does not yet
have its own seat, apparently as a consequence of more general political
disputes regarding the geographical location of Community institutions.
It is contemplated that at a later stage the agency will at least have authority to monitor compliance with Community directives and
regulations.
Efforts to achieve the goal of environmental protection at the Community level have met with decidedly mixed success to date as member
states have been slow to adopt national legislation conforming with Community directives. The Commission has been reluctant to bring actions
against member states to require such compliance and has taken very
little direct action at the level of local enforcement of Community regulations. As of the end of 1991, the Community had adopted approximately
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See KRAMER, supra note 11, $ 3.35.
Treaty on European Union, supra note 9, at art. 130s(3).
Id. at arts., 130s(l) & 189c.
Id. at art. 130s(2).
Council Regulation 1210/90, 1990 O.J., (L 120) 1.
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200 environment-related directives and regulations. 26 These include a directive requiring that the public be granted access to government-held
information with respect to the environment (with a number of broad
qualifications), 27 and a directive of 1985 (which took effect in 1988) making environmental impact assessments mandatory for certain projects
(e.g., projects involving hazardous or toxic substances or wastes), with
28
principles established for public participation.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) made its most significant
statement regarding the right of individual member states to adopt a high
level of environmental protection in Re Disposable Beer Cans: EC Commission v. Denmark.2 9 Denmark had adopted legislation prohibiting the
sale of metal cans and requiring sellers of glass bottles to implement a
system for collection and reuse. In connection with this system, government approval of containers was required in order to assure that the
maximum number of 30 different containers was not exceeded, which
would have made the system unmanageable. Under pressure from foreign exporters, Denmark added an exemption for sellers permitting them
to implement programs for collection and recycling (as opposed to collection and reuse), provided that their annual sales did not exceed certain
limits. The Commission did not challenge Denmark's ban on metal containers, but objected to the requirement of government approval on containers because this would arguably discriminate against foreign
manufacturers who might be required to purchase locally produced bottles. The Court of Justice cited Procureurde la Republic v. Association de
defense procurerbruleurs d'huiles usagees,30 for the proposition that protection of the environment is an essential objective of the Community
which justifies limits on free trade. The ECJ observed that this is now
confirmed by the Single European Act. It held that member states are
entitled to adopt a high level of protection, provided that measures are
justified by an objective for the general good of protecting the environment, and provided the restrictions imposed are necessary for attaining
the objective. The Court concluded that government approval of bottles
for reuse was justifiable because of the environmental objective and was
required by the nature of the reuse system. The Court struck down the
volume limitation which Denmark had imposed on the recycling system
26. Almost all Community measures have taken the form of directives, but there have been a
few instances of regulation.
27. Council Directive 909/313, 1990 O.J., (L 158) 56.
28. Council Directive 85/337, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40.
29. Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
30. 1985 E.C.R. 531.
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because it concluded that the limitation was disproportionate to the objective of protecting the environment. The Court noted that the recycling
system may be less favorable to manufacturers, including importers, because bottles intended for recycling could only be returned to the retailer
who sold them whereas the reuse system permitted the return of approved bottles to any retailer. The Court nevertheless upheld the Danish
scheme, with the exception of the recycling volume limitation.
Private individuals may play an increasingly important role in enforcing Community environmental arrangements. In Re Frau Kloppenburg,31 the Court of Justice solidified its position that private individuals
may invoke directives not duly implemented by member states, particularly when states have failed to adopt conforming legislation within the
time limits established by the directives, and when obligations are clear
and unconditional and need no further implementing legislation to be
32
enforced.
On the level of external relations, the Community is a party to a
number of international treaties relating to protection of the environment. 33 All of these treaties are entered into by the Community as socalled "mixed agreements" as to which both the Community and individual member states are parties. The mixed agreement form is used when
there is some uncertainty as to relative competencies, that is, when there
is some question whether the Community or individual member states
have the power under the Treaty of Rome to enter into the agreement. 34
As a party to the various treaties, the Community plays a role in meetings and conferences relating to them, although the member states apparently are responsible for implementing them.
The Treaty of Rome confers on the Council and Commission the
power to conduct international trade relations. 35 The SEA amendments
31. Case 687/85, 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 15 (1988).
32. A recent case decided by the High Court of Ireland, Brown v. An Bord Pleanala, 1
C.M.L.R. 3 (1990), involved an appeal from a local planning authority's grant of a construction
permit to a developer. Ireland had not yet implemented the EC Council Directive requiring the
undertaking of Environmental Impact Assessments for certain projects. The objectors claimed that a
developer had failed to include in its permit application all of the information required by the Directive. The High Court of Ireland held that, even if the Directive had been implemented in Ireland, the
express terms of the Directive did not specify that members of the public were entitled to challenge
the sufficiency of compliance with the Directive. The court held that the right to determine the
sufficiency of a permit application, including the adequacy of information furnished, is a matter for
the appropriate government authority.
33. See KRAMER, supra note 11, T 1.45.
34. See Meinhard Hilf, The Application of GA TT within the Member States of the European
Community, with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 153, 163-167 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
35. Treaty of Rome, supra note 8, at arts. 113-114.
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to the treaty confer on the Council the power to adopt measures for protection of the environment. These provisions, separately or in conjunction, would appear to give the Council and Commission the power to
adopt regulations affecting trade with non-member states for reasons relating to protection of the environment. Foreign exporters to the Community must certainly expect to be required to conform their goods to
standards established for intra-Community trade. There do not appear to
have been any specific measures adopted to bar third country imports on
environmental grounds, nor do any measures with purported extraterritorial effect such as the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act appear to
have been adopted. The Community has banned imports of hormone fed
beef in conjunction with a ban on the sale of such beef within the Community for health reasons. The United States has challenged the Community ban on the grounds that there is no scientific evidence to justify it
and that the measure is simply intended to protect the Community market from competition. This controversy is pending.
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, if it enters into force,
will clarify that the Community has the power to conclude international
agreements with respect to the environment. The Maastricht Treaty also
would preserve the right of the member states to conclude international
36
agreements with respect to the environment.
V.

ANALYZING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE

Current Community policy and law with respect to the environment
must be viewed in the context of more than thirty years of evolution.
While the founders of the Community may well have had the long term
goal of establishing an integrated European political and social arrangement, the 1958 Treaty of Rome was directed almost exclusively to economic issues. Provisions affecting social policy, such as the free
movement of persons, were incorporated into the treaty because of their
direct impact on cross-border economic flows. Protection of the environment was not explicitly dealt with in the treaty either as an economic
issue or a social goal. However, the Treaty of Rome was drafted in the
style of a constitution among states. The framers granted an extensive
power to the central institution of the Council-the power to direct the
approximation of laws directly affecting the functioning of the common
market. This constitutional grant was held within strict limits by a requirement of Council unanimity assuring that no state could be compelled to act against its own will. Moreover, the treaty as constitution
36. Treaty on European Union, supra note 9, at art. 130r(4).
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expressed its constraint against member state measures affecting crossborder trade in broad terms, namely by prohibiting measures having the
equivalent effect of quotas. The broad language of the treaty virtually
assured a large measure of reliance on a body charged with interpreting
it, in this case the European Court of Justice. In the 1970s the Council
was able to take action with respect to the environment because there
existed sufficient appreciation of the value of its protection and because
the Treaty of Rome was sufficiently flexible to provide a legal basis for
such action. This action required member state consensus. The Council
was able to withstand challenge from business organizations affected by
its actions because the Court of Justice was willing to read into the
Treaty of Rome the essential objective of environmental protection. The
actions of the Council and the decisions of the Court of Justice evidenced
a political will to extend the scope of a trade constitution.
An important lesson of the Treaty of Rome for regionalizing protection of the environment is the general understanding that the approximation or harmonization of national laws is a necessary component of a
successful economic integration scheme which does not deliberately seek
to reallocate wealth among its component member states. The fundamental laws of economics dictate that states with less strictly regulated production and distribution systems will possess trade advantages tending to
attract capital from more strictly regulated states. States with more
strictly regulated production and distribution systems will naturally seek
to impose restrictions on imports from less strictly regulated areas in order to protect both their capital base and, to the extent that the regulation of goods directly affects public welfare, to protect their social policy
choices. The Community has begun to demonstrate in the sphere of environmental protection that it is possible to achieve progressively the goal
of harmonization in a region in which significant disparities between the
level of economic development among member states exist.
The Community environmental harmonization system reserves to
the member states in the first instance the power to adopt and maintain
environmental protection legislation of their own choosing. Member
states are entitled to adopt environmental measures establishing a high
degree of protection because the objective of environmental protection is
recognized as an essential Community objective. Measures restricting
trade must be proportional to the objective sought to be achieved and
must be non-discriminatory (though, as Disposable Beer Cans suggests,
the principle of non-discrimination itself is somewhat flexible). The critical point is that the Community institutions have established that local
environmental legislation may restrict freedom of trade. Environmental
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legislation adopted by each member state may in fact impose costs which
affect member state exporters more than other domestic producers.
In the second instance, the Single European Act established a twotier system of central environmental regulation. The Council may by
strict consensus adopt environmental regulation with direct effect in the
member states (and by consensus decide that some direct measures may
be adopted by qualified majority). The constraint on the Council for the
taking of direct measures is that action is better taken at the Community
level than at the level of the individual member states. On the second tier,
the Council has been empowered to mandate by directive the harmonization of national laws in the absence of a consensus, that is, by qualified
majority voting, provided that the Parliament may force the Council to
act by consensus. On both levels, the individual member states are
granted the power to adopt measures more stringent than those approved
by the Council, provided that these more stringent measures are not inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome.
The Treaty of Rome structure in its initial phase principally addressed the problem of environmental protection by attempting to assure
that no single member state could undermine the basic principle of free
movement of goods by adopting restrictive measures, while at the same
moment providing an escape clause entitling states to act for purposes
consistent with the essential objectives of the Community. This arrangement, which allowed each state to determine the strength of its own public policy with respect to the environment, required a dispute settlement
institution and mechanism which would command the respect of the
member states and possess the power to definitively settle disputes. In
this initial phase, a strong dispute settlement institution was more important to the success of the Community than a strong decision-taking institution, the Council. Although the Council was granted the power to
direct the approximation of laws, this power could only be exercised by
consensus, and the potential for conflict between states was thereby deliberately minimized.
In the second phase of Community integration the Council's potential for creating dissension has been greatly expanded, as the qualified
majority voting procedure enables the Council to override the public policy of individual member states. The decision to enhance the power of the
Council followed thirty years of Community process and is unlikely to be
successfully replicated in another regional system at its initial phase.
Rather, the Community appears to have demonstrated that an extended
period of consensus-building may establish a platform for the construction of a non-consensual structure.
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The specific Community structure which permits the individual
member states to adopt and maintain environmental regulations more
stringent than the base established by the center is important to an undertaking involving states at disparate levels of economic development
and with different social values respecting the environment. It would be
exceedingly difficult for the Community to succeed on a political level if
it attempted to compel the more highly regulated states to abandon their
commitment to a clean environment. Moreover, there is little apparent
justification for lowering environmental standards in order to establish a
uniform base.
Finally, there could be no adequate Community response to environmental issues without the establishment of protection of the environment as a Community objective or goal. The establishment of a
Community objective requires a political commitment by the individual
member states and by the technocrats who create policy at the Community center in Brussels. In considering the potential legal arrangement for
protecting the environment in the North American Free Trade Agreement area and other regions, it must be emphasized that no end of sound
legal analysis will substitute for political commitment. The juridical arm
of the Community interprets the Treaty of Rome. It may assist in the
progressive development of Community institutions and policy, but it
cannot sustain policy which diverges from that of the political institutions for an extended period.
There are a few further observations of a somewhat more cautionary
nature to make with respect to the evolution of the Community environmental legal regime. First, the Community legal regime should not yet be
mistaken for the federal-state environmental regime in the United States.
While the Single European Act has vested the Council with the power to
adopt directly applicable Community-wide regulation, that power generally is to be exercised only with the unanimous consent of the member
states. The American federal legislative power is exercised by a majority
of both houses of Congress, subject to Presidential veto (and override).
The concentration of legislative power with respect to the environment in
the U.S. federal government is greater than in the Community because it
is easier to employ. Further, although the Commission, like the Executive branch, has the power to enforce Community directives and regulations, the European Environment Agency does not have an enforcement
power analogous to the enforcement power of the EPA. The Commission
has not been active in the enforcement of environmental directives and
regulations, and the member states of the Community have not adequately implemented environmental directives.
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The member states of the European Community are at different
stages of economic development. However, the substantial differences in
per capita income existing, for example, between Germany and Portugal
are not representative of the typical disparity between industrialized and
developing countries. The achievement of acceptable base environmental
standards among Community states is in some measure dependent on the
capacity of the member states to implement them without severe economic hardship. The political systems in place in the twelve Community
countries are somewhat different, but all are liberal representative democracies with a commitment to human rights as evidenced by their adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights. The substantial
homogeneity in Community living standards and political-social values
provides a basis for consensus or quasi-consensus, whether with respect
to environmental protection standards, competition law or other regulatory regimes. Regional arrangements which attempt to integrate economies and political-social structures of substantially more disparate
character may find it more difficult to allocate decision-making authority
to central institutions.
VI.

THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The fact that the proposed integration of the Canadian, Mexican
and United States economies is characterized as a free trade area as opposed to a customs union has a certain limited significance from the
standpoint of international trade regulation. A free trade area (FTA) involves the removal of tariffs and other regulations affecting trade between
its member states, but not the establishment of the common customs wall
which characterizes the customs union. Beyond this distinction, there is
nothing in the law of international trade which suggests that a free trade
area is a more limited arrangement than a customs union. The member
states of an FTA may choose to harmonize their laws, establish juridical
institutions and central legislative organs. If we create a NAFTA which
is less comprehensive than the European Community it is because we
choose to and not because of any constraint imposed by international
37
trade law.
The NAFTA negotiations were conducted largely in secret. Nevertheless, under political pressure from Congress generated in the first instance by environmental interest groups, the Bush Administration was
37. See Abbott, GATT and the European Community, supra note 2, at 13-15; Abbott, Integration without Institutions,supra note 2, at text accompanying nn.7-14.
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required to specify in considerable detail its proposals with respect to the
environment. The most comprehensive statement of Administration proposals was contained in an October 15, 1991 draft Review of US.-Mexico
Environmental Issues prepared by an Interagency Task Force Coordinated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). I
have described the Administration proposals elsewhere 38 and will only
briefly summarize the essential elements here, noting that U.S.-Canada
issues were not similarly addressed. The Administration proposed that
each country would be responsible for its own environmental program.
The Administration specifically disclaimed interest in seeking the harmonization of environmental legislation, suggesting that this would be
viewed by Mexico as "eco-protectionism." There were references to the
formation of a mechanism for resolving environmental disputes of a scientific or technical nature, but no specific proposals. The Administration
proposed to rely on increased cooperation between the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Mexican Subsecretaria de Desarrollo
Urbano y Ecologia (SEDUE), the Mexican agency charged with enforcement of Mexico's recently adopted environmental legislation, for resolution of environmental issues. The Administration did not plan to seek a
binding funding commitment to enforcement by Mexico of its environmental laws. This was a critical decision as Mexico's environment-related
budget is extremely low in comparison to that of the United States. The
Administration proposed enhanced cooperation in cleaning up the U.S.Mexico border area. The Administration also committed itself to enhancing the role of environmental interest groups in the formulation of policy.
In February 1992 an Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area jointly prepared by the EPA and SEDUE was released (Border Plan).39 The Border Plan envisions an ambitious program
for clean-up of the U.S.-Mexico border area, including the provision of
$326 million in funding for the first year (1993) of the plan, largely for
construction projects to improve or expand waste water treatment, waste
disposal and transportation systems. Significant funding is proposed to be
directed to improving enforcement measures. 4° Enhanced enforcement
cooperation and coordination between the EPA and SEDUE is proposed.
On an institutional level, the Border Plan generally relies on independent
38. See Abbott, supra note 7. A final version of the Review was released in February 1992. It is
reported to be substantially the same as the October 15 draft.
39. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR
THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA (First Stage) (and Summary thereof dated February 1992)
(hereinafter BORDER PLAN].

40. SEDUE's 1992 operational budget for border area enforcement will increase 450 percent to
$6.3 million. Id. at 21.
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yet cooperative efforts between the EPA and SEDUE, as well as on the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). 4 1 The IBWC is
responsible for undertaking border water sanitation measures or works
mutually agreed by the two governments. It operates upon joint agreement of the Mexican and United States governments. 42 The EPA and
SEDUE note in the Border Plan that it will continue whether or not the
NAFTA is successfully concluded. 4 3 So far the U.S. Congress has balked
at funding the plan. 44
The Administration expressly based its NAFFA negotiating policy
at least in part on its conclusion that the NAFTA would not result in any
significant degradation of Mexico's environment and, conversely, that enhanced Mexican economic development is likely to result in improved
environmental conditions. The Administration argued that without a
NAFTA, U.S. manufacturers would continue to move to Mexico. The
NAFTA would not therefore create an exceptional situation.
The Bush Administration was not itself monolithic. There was good
reason to believe that the EPA pushed for a strong Mexican commitment
on the environment while the State Department was resisting this goal.
The Border Plan can be seen as an expression of the strong EPA commitment to pursuing environmentally sound development regardless of
whether a NAFTA was negotiated. The Office of the USTR is not itself
expert in environmental policy and relies in large measure on analysis by
41. The IBWC is the successor to the International Boundary Commission, first established by
Mexico-U.S. treaty, the International Boundary Convention of 1889, and later replaced by the Water
Treaty of 1944.
42. See BORDER PLAN supra note 39, at A-6. There is also in place a 1983 Agreement between
the United States and Mexico on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area which provides a framework for cooperation between the Mexican and
United States governments and has been the subject of several annexes establishing cooperative efforts, information sharing and certain emissions standards for border enterprises. Id. at A-6 to A-7.
Pursuant to a joint Presidential Communique of November 1990, a Binational Commission involving cabinet level officials of both the Mexican and U.S. governments meets at least annually to
consider problems of mutual interest. Id. at A-10 to A-I 1.
43. Id. at 1-5.
44. The fiscal 1993 appropriation for the EPA cut $47 million from the $80 million requested to
control border area sewage flows. Env't Rep. (BNA), Oct. 9, 1992, at 1544.
The Mexico-U.S. Border Plan reflects a commitment at least within a part of the Bush Administration to pursuing meaningful environmental measures within the NAFTA framework. The Border
Plan appears to represent the efforts of EPA officials who individually may be in a position to influence federal government policy with respect to the environment beyond the limited term a single
administration. These officials will play an important role in the evolution of the NAFTA regime.
One specific suggestion with respect to the NAFTA emerges from a review of the Border Plan. If the
Mexican government is serious about the budget commitments set forth in the Plan, it would not be
unreasonable to suggest that those funding commitments appear as nonbinding environmental
budget targets in a side letter or annex to the NAFTA agreement. Those targets might be looked to
as a measure of Mexico's good faith with regard to pursuing an environmental policy consistent with
a progressive regional environmental arrangement. Of course, it would be reasonable for Mexico to
request the United States and Canada to similarly include budget targets for their own programs.
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other agencies. A number of members of Congress, of course, at various
times expressed great concern with the Bush Administration's position
with respect to the environment.
The position of the Mexican government during the NAFTA negotiations appeared to be one of attempting to accommodate the interests of
the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, it perhaps may be disingenuous
to suggest that the Mexican government is or will remain hostile to joint
efforts directed at the environment. Mexico City is reported to be experiencing severe problems in relation to the environment. Degraded environmental conditions result in significant health and infrastructurerelated expenses. Although financial constraints may preclude Mexico
from undertaking an ambitious environmental program, the United
States in general may find a more sympathetic attitude to environmental
protection in Mexico than is commonly assumed.
In the final analysis, the draft of the NAFTA which has been signed
on behalf of Canada, Mexico and the United States, proposes a fairly
progressive arrangement with respect to the environment, though short
of an effort at harmonization. The draft NAFTA provides that each
country is entitled to maintain technical standards4 5 and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures" more stringent than international standards,
and shall not be required to decrease its level of protection. Although the
draft agreement permits each party to challenge the others' regulations
on the grounds that they are disguised barriers to trade, e.g. because unsupported by scientific data, the draft agreement places the burden of
proof on the complaining party.47 With respect to questions of verifiability for scientific purposes, the prospects of proving that a measure
cannot be scientifically justified are fairly remote. Therefore, as a practical matter, each party will be entitled to maintain its own regulatory
standards. Moreover, the draft NAFTA contains two important additional measures with respect to environmental and health regulation.
First, the agreement expressly provides that specified international treaties with respect to the environment will prevail over the NAFTA. 4 Second, the investment chapter provides that each party will refrain from
seeking to attract or retain investments by offering to lower its health,
safety or environmental standards. 49
45. Draft NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 904(2) and 905(3).
46. Id. at arts. 754(2), 755(3).
47. Id. at arts. 765(6), 914(4).

48. Id. at art. 104.
49. Id. at art. 1114(2). See also infra note 59 and accompanying text with respect to the proposed North American Commission on the Environment.
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The foregoing arrangement addresses perhaps the deepest concern
of the interest groups which lobbied with respect to the environmental
provisions of the NAFTA, i.e. that the NAFTA might provide a vehicle
for the lowering of U.S. environmental standards. Nevertheless, while the
draft NAFTA addresses this concern as a short term matter, the failure
of the NAFTA to provide for the progressive harmonization of laws and
regulations affecting transborder economic flows across the broad spectrum of subject matter areas may not serve the best long-term interests of
the state parties to the NAFTA or its individual inhabitants.
Significant disparities in legal regimes will inevitably lead to an allocation of economic resources at least partially based on the identification
of the least restrictive regulatory environment. This is not to suggest that
business enterprises will ignore the critical factors of labor force skills,
access to natural and industrial resources, transportation costs, etc. in
decision-making, but only that regulatory environment is a significant
decision-making factor. Were this not the case, business enterprises
would not continually argue to governmental agencies that added regulatory measures would (and do) force them to relocate. If regulations affecting business enterprises in areas such as health and safety, laborrelated practices, pollution control, taxation and other matters reflect a
substantial disparity, the rational firm will move to take advantage of
such disparities where a sufficient economic advantage can be demonstrated. To suggest otherwise, on the basis of national sentiment, for example, is to ignore the fundamental rules of economics which support the
establishment of a liberal trading regime. The rational business enterprise will move to a location where its profits will be maximized and will
factor government regulation of the enterprise into its decision as a cost
of doing business. Moreover, firms exporting capital to the NAFTA will
be engaged in the same decision-making process as firms presently located within the NAFTA and other factors being equal will choose the
less restrictive regulatory environment, accelerating whatever effects
such decision criteria will have.
The economic gain from a non-harmonization policy will accrue to
enterprises which would move across borders to take advantage of a lax
regulatory environment or which would choose the location to which to
export production capital to the enlarged market on the basis of the less
restrictive environment. This will presumably accelerate economic development in less developed areas of Mexico which have not otherwise
attracted capital investment. In the short term, this investment will increase per capita income in the less developed areas. However, shortterm developmental gains without attention to health, labor, environ-
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mental and other interests are bound to produce adverse long-term effects. The type of negative long-term effects which result from a
commitment to accelerated economic growth and an inattention to environmental factors, as an example, are now evident throughout Eastern
Europe and the Far East. Moreover, if it is demonstrated that U.S. and
Canadian industries are moving into Mexico as a consequence of less
restrictive regulatory regimes, this will undoubtedly place political stress
on the NAFTA arrangement. U.S. and Canadian workers may justifiably
complain that the absence of a reasonably level playing field discriminates against them.
A critical question which faced the NAFTA negotiators was
whether a country whose legislative measure is found to be inconsistent
with the agreement will have to withdraw or reform the measure or
merely face the withdrawal of trade benefits by the other member states.
A fundamental characteristic of decisions of the European Court of Justice is that they are binding on the members and may not be avoided by
the payment of trade compensation. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area
agreement provides for binding dispute settlement in the sense of requiring remedial action only with respect to the resolution of anti-dumping
and countervailing duty disputes. In other cases, each party is entitled to
maintain its own interpretation of the free trade agreement even if contrary to the decision of an arbitral tribunal, provided that it must accept
the withdrawal of benefits from other parties. Although it would have
enhanced the commitment of the parties to a NAFTA, it seemed doubtful that the Bush Administration would propose that the decisions of a
NAFTA dispute settlement authority with respect to environmental issues would be binding in the sense of requiring remedial action.50
The institutional arrangements in fact proposed under the draft
NAFTA are more extensive than those established by the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement. The NAFTA would establish a Free
Trade Commission (Commission) composed of cabinet level representatives of the parties or their designees, which will take decisions by consensus.5 1 The functions of the Commission are to supervise the
implementation, oversee the elaboration, and resolve disputes under the
agreement, as well as to supervise the work of the various committees
50. It should be noted that the European Community dispute settlement structure is not characteristic of that historically found in international trade agreements. Most trade treaties have dealt
with the resolution of disputes in a manner which permits the withdrawal of concessions or termination of the treaty in the event of non-compliance. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 23-26 (2d ed. 1990). The Treaty of Rome makes no
provision for termination or withdrawal.
51. Draft NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 2001(1) and (4).
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and working groups established under the agreement. 52 The Commission
will establish and oversee a Secretariat, the functions of which are to
provide assistance to the Commission, and provide administrative assist53
ance to dispute settlement panels, committees and working groups.
There is once again a separate dispute settlement mechanism established
with respect to anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters,5 4 and certain separate dispute settlement arrangements are also made with respect
to financial services. 55 Ordinarily a complaining party may exclusively
select either the GATT or NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism. 56 A
respondent to an environment-related complaint, however, may demand
that the matter be resolved under the NAFTA dispute settlement arrangement. 57 The NAFTA would also establish a number of working
groups and committees, without authority to make decisions binding on
the parties, to assist in monitoring and facilitating the cooperative implementation of various sectors of the agreement.58
In September 1992 the senior officials of Canada, Mexico and the
United States responsible for the environment announced the intention of
their governments to create a North American Commission on the Environment which would provide a formal mechanism for environment-related cooperation among the three countries. As of November 1992 an
agreement to form the Commission had not yet been concluded and the
prospective mandate of the Commission was not set. As of November it
appeared that the primary functions of the Commission would be to
52. Id at art 2001(2).
53. Id. at art. 2002.
54. Id. at Chapter Nineteen.
55. The modifications to the general dispute settlement arrangement involve the qualifications
of panelists and limitations on the suspension of benefits. Id. at art. 1415. There is also a separate
procedure by which a private party investor is entitled to initiate binding third party arbitration with
respect to investment-related measures. Id at Chapter Eleven, Subchapter B.
56. Id at art. 2005(1) and (6).
57. Id. at art 2005(3) and (4). These provisions set forth the types of environmental arrangements covered by this rule.
58. Pursuant to the draft NAFTA eight committees and six working groups would be established. See id at Annex 2001.2. For example, the agreement provides for establishment of a Committee on Agricultural Trade to monitor and promote cooperation on the implementation of
agriculture-related measures. Id at art. 708. A Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
will be established to facilitate, inter alia, enhancement of food safety and improvement of sanitary
and phytosanitary conditions, and to pursue the equivalence of sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
to facilitate technical cooperation and consultations, including those involving dispute settlement.
This committee may also establish and determine the mandate of working groups. Id. at art. 764. A
Committee on Standards-Related Measures will be established to monitor and implement the technical standards provisions of the agreement, and to facilitate the attainment of standards compatibility
and enforcement, as well as to facilitate consultations regarding disputes. Id. at art. 913. This committee has the authority to establish and determine the scope and mandate of subcommittees and
working groups, which may consult with experts and interest groups. The establishment of several
specific subcommittees and working groups is mandated. Id. at art. 913(4) and (5).
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monitor environment-related developments and provide a forum for consultation. President-elect Clinton proposed the creation of an environmental protection commission with resources to prevent and clean-up
pollution, as well as with enforcement powers.5 9 Negotiations with respect to the trilateral environmental commission apparently will proceed
on a parallel track with the principal NAFTA approval process.
The draft NAFTA does not establish a separate environmental regime with respect to third countries. Since the draft NAFTA does not
establish central rule-making institutions, the risk that the NAFTA parties will jointly adopt discriminatory measures with respect to protection
of the environment is minimized. The adoption and enforcement of environmental laws is left to each member of the NAFTA and there should
be no specific environmental NAFTA-related effect on third countries.
If the environment-related provisions of the draft NAFTA are negotiated further, there are two important lessons which the negotiators
might draw from the European Community experience. First, the value
of a trade charter will be enhanced by the establishment of dispute settlement institutions with the power to compel compliance by the country
parties to the agreement. We saw in the EC experience that the European
Court of Justice was able to encourage the progressive development of a
body of environmental law somewhat in advance of its express institutional charter. While it could not have done so without the tacit cooperation of the EC political institutions, it was enabled to proceed on behalf
of the Community without awaiting the ponderous process of a charter
revision. Moreover, it was able to act without grave concern over promoting the gradual disintegration of the Community because the member
states were not able to avoid their obligations (by agreeing to the withdrawal of previously granted concessions by other members).
The second lesson which might be drawn from the Community experience is the importance of consensus building. In its initial stages, the
central decision-making institution of the Community acted by strict
consensus. No member state was compelled to act against its own perceived interests. Similarly, if a central decision-making NAFTA institu59. See Canada, US. and Mexican Environment Ministers Agree in Principle to Set Up a North
American Commission, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Sept. 17, 1992 (available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library,
OMNI File); Clinton Endorses NAFTA with Certain Reservations, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1720
(Oct. 7, 1992); CountriesSaid to Finish Work by 1993 on TrilateralEnvironmental Commission, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), Nov. 18, 1992 (available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, BNABTD File).
President-elect Clinton also suggested a trilateral commission to address labor issues arising as a
consequence of the NAFTA. He proposed that the environment and labor commission negotiations
proceed on a parallel track with the NAFTA. See Clinton Endorses NAFTA with Certain Reservations; supra.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:173

tion with respect to the environment is established, at least during the
formative years of the NAFTA it should likewise operate on the basis of
consensus. This will reduce the perception of threat to each nation's sovereign prerogative. The Community experience suggests that a consensus-based arrangement will be able to make progress toward the
harmonization of legal regimes, even if somewhat slowly. Only after the
body politic as a whole becomes comfortable with the notion of a regional authority should thoughts turn to action by less than consensus. 6°
The factor which fundamentally distinguishes the Bush Administration's NAFTA proposals for the environment, as reflected in the signed
draft of the agreement, and the current European Community environmental program is political commitment to protection of the environment as a goal of the regional arrangement. Congress, at the instigation
of environmental interest groups, forced the Bush Administration's attention to the environment. The NAFTA environmental program represents the minimum regime that the Administration considered might be
acceptable to the Congress.
Regional integration involves an expression of political will by independent sovereign states. The treaty establishing a regional arrangement represents the aspirations of its founders. Academic institutions
may assist in defining relevant policy choices and proposing legal mechanisms for effectuating those choices. Juridical institutions may achieve
progressive social goals at the margins of their treaty charter, but they
will not function independently of their political foundations. The high
level of attention to the environment in the European Community legal
instruments and institutions results from a high level of political commitment. The Community has demonstrated that political commitment can
be translated into a workable legal framework. The Community model is
useful for informing the NAFTA but is not a substitute for political commitment by the NAFTA founders to regional institutions embodying social goals. President-elect Clinton has expressed a political commitment
to an environmentally progressive NAFTA and has proposed revisiting
the overall NAFTA environmental arrangement prior to its approval by
the U.S. Congress. This political commitment seems likely to lead to a
more effective NAFTA institutional arrangement explicitly or implicitly
aimed at promoting the gradual harmonization of environmental regulation in the NAFTA territory.
60. An additional suggestion arising from the draft Maastricht Treaty on European Union is
that a regional parliament with effective power is an important and necessary democratic counterbalance to a strong central regional executive. This becomes all the more important as central institutions begin to act by less than strict consensus.
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VII.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL APPROACHES TO PROTECTION
OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Regionalization of trade-related environmental protection issues
may pose the same disadvantages as regionalization of trade issues as a
whole. Regional arrangements may engage in discriminatory practices
which will have a substantially greater impact on third countries than
single country discrimination. Relatively wealthy northern blocs of states
will likely adopt higher environmental standards than relatively poor
southern blocs. States without allegiance to a particular bloc may find it
difficult to conform their exports to multiple environmental standards.
Trade and environmental protection patterns may turn inward if differences between regional standards cannot be accommodated. Attention to
regional issues may divert attention from seeking solutions to environmental problems on a global basis.
On the other side of the equation, regional arrangements may estabfish effective models for global solutions to environmental problems. Certainly the European Community is ahead of the GATT in dealing with
the relationship between trade and the environment. As other models
evolve there may well emerge an arrangement which will facilitate global
economic integration and protection of the environment while demanding a lesser concession of national sovereign prerogative than does the
Community structure. Perhaps the NAFTA will be the regional model
for a global solution to the problem of environmental protection.
The risk of regionalization of environmental issues must be balanced
against the net positive effect which regional arrangements are likely to
have on the environment itself. It is suggested that environmental protection is not a zero sum game. While some environmentally harmful production may be shifted from more industrialized regions to less
developed regions, improvements in the more industrialized regions will
not likely be offset by declining standards in the less developed regions.
The risk of a mere redistribution of environmental degradation should be
addressed in the GATT, if possible, or in the more industrialized regions,
if necessary, through the adoption of trade-related measures designed to
discourage the exportation of products produced by environmentally unsound processes. With adequate attention from the trading community,
the global welfare effect of the regionalization of environmental issues
should be positive.

